Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 38
Number 4 Summer 2011

Article 7

1-1-2011

Confidentiality and Disclosure: What the New
ABA Criminal Justice Standards (Don't) Say about
the Duties of Defense Counsel
Cecila Klingele

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Cecila Klingele, Confidentiality and Disclosure: What the New ABA Criminal Justice Standards (Don't) Say about the Duties of Defense
Counsel, 38 Hastings Const. L.Q. 983 (2011).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol38/iss4/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Confidentiality and Disclosure:
What the New ABA Criminal Justice
Standards (Don't) Say About the Duties of
Defense Counsel
by CECELIA KLINGELE*
Introduction
The duty to hold client confidences inviolate is one of the
defining features of a lawyer's professional identity. One law school
text describes the duty of confidentiality as "one of the most
fundamental, even sacred, professional obligations of a lawyer."
Another explains that the "ability to keep secrets is, if not the heart of
the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client, its most visible, tangible
aspect."2 Courts, too, have long lauded the unique protections
afforded by both the evidentiary attorney-client privilege and the
broader ethical duty to guard against disclosure of client
The image of the lawyer as "keeper of
communications
* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School. Many thanks
to Bruce Green and Rory Little for the opportunity to contribute to the ABA Roundtable
discussions, and to the University of Wisconsin Law School and Cardozo Law School and
their Roundtable participants for the opportunity to engage talented and experienced
practitioners in a thoughtful discussion of confidentiality issues.
1. W. BRADLEY WENDEL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS 115 (2004).
2. JAMES E. MOLITERNO, ETHICS OF THE LAWYER'S WORK 152 (2d ed. 2003).

3. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (stating that
the attorney-client privilege "is intended to encourage 'full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the
observance of law and the administration of justice"'); Styles v. Mumbert, 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d
880, 884 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The duty of confidentiality of client information involves public
policies of paramount importance."); Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 536 A.2d 243,
251 (N.J. 1988) (citations omitted) ("[T]he ethical obligation of every attorney to preserve
the confidences and secrets of a client is basic to the legitimate practice of law . ...
Preserving the sanctity of confidentiality of a client's disclosures to his attorney will
encourage an open atmosphere of trust, thus enabling the attorney to do the best job he
can for the client."). There are also those who view the duty of confidentiality with more
[983]
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confidences" is widely embraced by the legal profession as evidence
of the protection afforded by counsel against the power of the State.!
Nonetheless, a lawyer's confidentiality obligations are far from
absolute. Both the attorney-client privilege and the ethical duty of
confidentiality contain exceptions permitting disclosure of a
significant subset of client communications For criminal defense
counsel, issues of confidentiality and disclosure may arise throughout
the course of representation, from the moment of initial client contact
through possible post-representation litigation. When they do,
counsel must confront difficult questions regarding what to tell clients
about the limits of confidentiality; whether, when, and to whom
disclosure should be made; and to what degree post-representation
disclosures should be offered to successor counsel and to courts
adjudicating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In addressing
these matters, criminal defense lawyers may seek guidance from both
informal and formal sources. Personal values and temperament will
of course affect the approach lawyers take to client counseling and
disclosure decisions; also, local professional customs, passed on to
new attorneys by their mentors and supervisors, may exert an even
greater influence on attorney conduct.
Other sources of guidance will be more formal. Most influential
of these will be the rules of professional conduct that govern the
behavior of lawyers within a specified jurisdiction: Because breach
skepticism than admiration. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Confidentiality Fetish, THE
ATLANTIC, Dec. 2004, at 113, 113-14 (contending "[t]he bar's commitment to
confidentiality is not just an ideology; it is also a marketing strategy" that allows lawyers to
"give clients something that other professionals, with the exception of doctors and priests,
cannot"); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REv. 351
(1989) (suggesting that strong confidentiality rules are not necessary to ensure full
disclosure of relevant facts by the client).
4. The depth of lawyers' commitment to confidentiality was demonstrated
repeatedly throughout the ABA Roundtable discussions at both the University of
Wisconsin and Cardozo Law Schools. Numerous lawyers voiced their belief that clients
should be promised absolute confidentiality, both because it facilitated lawyer-client
communication, and because, in their own experience, disclosure occurred only in very
rare instances.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989) (discussing the crimefraud exception to the attorney-client privilege); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.6(b)(1)-(3) (2002) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
6. See, e.g., Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience by Subordinate Attorneys:
Lessons from Social Psychology, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 451, 453 (2007) (drawing on social
psychology research to explain the influence of legal practice settings and culture on
professional behavior of attorneys and suggesting that contextual factors may have more
to do with behavioral decisions than personality traits or values).
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may result in professional sanction, lawyers are likely to pay close
attention to the content of these rules.' A separate and potentially
influential source of formal guidance can be found in the American
Bar Association's Criminal Justice Standards. Although the current
Standards overlap to some degree with rules of professional conduct,"
they provide broad guidance not only with respect to defense
counsel's ethical obligations but with respect to most aspects of the
lawyer's professional life. Since their introduction more than thirtyfive years ago, the Criminal Justice Standards have offered defense
counsel guidance on many important aspects of client representation,
ranging from initial client contact to cooperation with post-conviction
litigation.9 Some of these Standards have attained binding force by
virtue of their incorporation into state legislation, rules of criminal
procedure, or court practice rules. 0 Others, while not enforceable
through disciplinary proceedings or other litigation, remain
influential. The Standards have been widely cited by courts, quoted
by advocates, and implemented by reform efforts designed to
improve the criminal justice system."
Given the historically important role played by the current
Standards in criminal defense policy and practice, it is appropriate to
examine in some detail recent proposed revisions to the Standards
governing the function of defense counsel with respect to matters of
confidentiality. This Essay discusses several implications of the

7. Every jurisdiction, with the exception of the State of California, has adopted a
Code of Professional Conduct modeled at least in part on the ABA Rules of Professional
Conduct. See ABA, Model Rules of Prof'I Conduct Dates of Adoption,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha..states.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2010) (listing states
that have adopted the Model Rules with year of adoption). These rules are enforced, to a
greater or lesser degree, through formal disciplinary proceedings adjudicated by a state
bar or state high court. See MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROBLEMS IN LEGAL

ETHICS 42-43 (8th ed. 2007).
8. Compare MODEL RULES, supra note 5, MODEL RULE 1.6(b)(1)-(3),

with

STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-3.7(d) (Proposed
Revisions 2010) [hereinafter "PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS"]; Rory K. Little, The
Role of Reporter for a Law Project, 38 Hastings Const. L.Q. 747 (Appendix: ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice: Proposed Revisions to Standards for the Defense
Function) (2011) [hereinafter Little, App.: Proposed Defense Standards].
9. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-3.1, 48.6 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter "1993 DEFENSE STANDARDS"].

10. See Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty
Years of Excellence, 23 CRIM. JUST. 10, 11 (2009) (describing methods by which
jurisdictions and courts have adopted the Standards).
11. Id. at 11-12.
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proposed changes for the way in which defense counsel maintain the
confidentiality of client communications, suggesting that despite the
many strengths of the Proposed Standards, the revisions circumvent
critical questions that practitioners must confront with respect to
confidentiality and disclosure. Part One examines the manner in
which the current Standards direct lawyers to advise their new clients
on the duty of confidentiality and identifies potentially inadvertent
ways in which the current Standards may encourage counsel to
withhold important information from their clients. Part Two focuses
on how the current Standards govern disclosure of client
communications in anticipation of physical harm or criminal conduct
by the client, noting critical omissions in the guidance offered to
defense counsel who find themselves in such situations. Part Three
briefly addresses the lawyer's confidentiality obligations following
representation, examining Proposed Standard 4-4.6, which governs
communications with successor counsel, and Proposed Standard 4-9.6,
which pertains to legal claims of ineffective assistance brought by
former clients. While acknowledging that many of the proposed
changes to the current Standards enhance their usefulness to
practicing lawyers, I argue that the current Standards could be further
revitalized and their influence increased if they were to more directly
tackle difficult questions on which they are now silent.
I. Defining the Bounds of Confidentiality:
What to Tell the Client?
The first meeting between a criminal defendant and his lawyer is
almost always an anxiety-laden event for the client. Faced with the
prospect of criminal conviction and sanction, the client is in need of
honest, direct counsel regarding what lies ahead. Particularly for the
client who lacks experience in the criminal justice system, the initial
interview promises a welcome opportunity to gain a better sense of
what to expect from both the criminal justice system and the lawyerclient relationship.
When the client first meets with his lawyer, he will inevitably
disclose information about his case. How much information and of
what kind will vary depending on the circumstances of the meeting,
the context of the case, and the relationship between lawyer and
client. Within the legal community, it is widely accepted that the duty
of confidentiality and its complementary predecessor, the attorneyclient privilege, improve the quality of attorney-client counseling by
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encouraging clients to provide their lawyers with the facts necessary
to offer good counsel." Whether this assumption is empirically
justified is a matter of debate; regardless, a desire for open client
communication indisputably provides the justification for the duty
and the privilege." Consequently, given the presumed importance of
confidentiality to the integrity of the attorney-client relationship, it
may come as a surprise that studies suggest that lawyers routinely fail
to counsel their clients about both the existence and the scope of
attorney-client confidentiality.14
What do the current Standards have to say about this failure?
The current Defense Function Standards offer considerable guidance
concerning many aspects of the early stages of representation, and the
Proposed Standards go even further in outlining what a lawyer should
and should not do to set the stage for a productive lawyer-client
relationship. Taken in combination, Proposed Standards 4-3.1
("Establishing and Maintaining an Effective Client Relationship"), 43.2 ("Interviewing the Client"), 4-3.8 ("Duty to Keep Client
Informed"), and 4-5.1 ("Advising the Accused") attempt to provide
defense counsel with a roadmap for establishing a working
relationship with the criminal defendant. These Standards require
counsel to consult with the client early and often," answer questions,
12. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHIcs 244-45 (5th ed.
2009).
13. In Swidler & Berlin v. United States, the Supreme Court observed that although
the handful of studies that existed "d[id] not reach firm conclusions on whether limiting
the privilege would discourage full and frank communication," it was apparent that "a
substantial number of clients and attorneys think the privilege encourages candor." 524
U.S. 399, 409 n.4 (1998) (emphasis added).
14. Although research studies are limited, one frequently-cited study conducted in
Thompkins County, New York, found that more than 20% of lawyers reported "almost
never" discussing confidentiality with their clients and almost 60% more discussed
confidentiality with their clients in only about half of all cases. Zacharias, supra note 3, at
382. When the lawyers surveyed did discuss confidentiality, less than 28% explained to
clients that their confidentiality obligations were not absolute. Id. at 386. A 1993 study
found that more than half of the surveyed criminal defense lawyers in a New Jersey survey
did discuss confidentiality with their clients at least 75 percent of the time. Leslie C.
Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Responses to Clients Who
Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 81, 121 n.179 (1994). At the same time,
however, the lawyers surveyed in the Levin study generally did not discuss exceptions to
the rule of confidentiality for fear it would inhibit useful client disclosures. Id. at 122-23.
Participants in both the Wisconsin and Cardozo Roundtable discussions echoed that
sentiment.
15. See PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-3.3(b) ("Defense counsel
should meet with the client in person unless impracticable, and very early in the
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plan defense strategies," and offer holistic advice" in a way that
enhances the client's ability to process the information counsel
provides.' 9 Yet, although the Standards are in many ways detailed,
they do not provide clear guidance regarding whether, how, or when
a lawyer should discuss the scope of confidentiality of attorney-client
communications with the client.
Both the current Defense Function Standards and the Proposed
Standards direct defense counsel to "seek to establish a relationship
of trust and confidence with the accused" and to do so in part by
discussing matters of confidentiality.20 The current Standards direct
defense counsel, when establishing a relationship with a new client, to
"explain the extent to which counsel's obligation of confidentiality
makes privileged the accused's disclosures." 2' The purpose behind
such a requirement seems obvious: Because the client will suffer the
consequences of his decision to provide or withhold information from
his lawyer, respect for client autonomy suggests that the lawyer
representation interview the client in depth .

. .

. Counsel should interview the client as

many times as is necessary for effective representations, which in all but the most simple
and routine cases will normally mean more than once."); Little, App.: Proposed Defense
Standards, supra note 8.
16. See PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-3.8(a) ("Defense counsel
should timely explain and discuss developments in the case with the client to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation."); Little, App.: Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 8.
17. See PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-3.3(c) ("Early on in the
representation, defense counsel should also consider, and discuss with the client, other
relevant topics such as (i) the likely length and course of the pending proceedings; (ii)
potential sources of helpful information and evidence; (iii) the range of potential
outcomes, and punishments if convicted; [and] (iv) the possibility of a negotiated
disposition, including the costs and benefits of cooperation with the government and the
possibility of lesser-included offenses."); Little, App.: Proposed Defense Standards, supra
note 8.
18. See PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-5.1(b) (when advising an
accused, defense counsel "may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as
moral, economic, social or political factors that may be relevant to the client's situation.");
Little, App.: Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 8.
19. See PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-3.8(a) ("Defense counsel
should timely explain and discuss developments in the case with the client to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation."); id. Standard 4-5.1(c) ("Defense counsel should provide the client with
such advice sufficiently in advance of decisions to allow the client to consider the options,
and avoid unnecessarily rushing the accused into decisions."); Little, App.: Proposed
Defense Standards, supra note 8.
20. 1993 DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 4-3.1(a); PROPOSED DEFENSE
STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-3.1(a).
21. 1993 DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 4-3.1(a) (emphasis added).
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should inform the defendant of the "rules of play," explaining clearly
what kinds of communications will be held in absolute confidence and
which may be subject to disclosure, with or without client consent.
Unlike the current Standards, the Proposed Standards do not
explicitly require counsel to inform the client of the scope of
confidentiality. Instead, they direct defense counsel to inform the
new client "that the attorney-client privilege strongly protects the
confidentiality of communications with counsel." 22 In this way, the
Proposed Standards emphasize confidentiality over its exceptions,
reflecting what appears to be common practice among defense
attorneys." This shift in emphasis, while subtle, raises the question of
whether (and, if so, to what degree) defense counsel is still permitted
(or ought to be encouraged) to discuss the circumstances in which
otherwise confidential communications may be subject to disclosure.
In answering that question, it is appropriate to look ahead from
the moment when counsel first raises the subject of confidentiality
(however defined) to the client interview that follows. Proposed
Standard 4-3.1 requires the lawyer to explain "the necessity for frank
and honest discussion of all facts known to the client in order to
provide an effective defense,"2 4 while Proposed Standard 4-3.3
reiterates that during client interviews defense counsel should
"encourage full and candid disclosure by the client." 25 Because it
would not be inconsistent for a lawyer to encourage full candor while
22. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-3.1(a) (emphasis added).
Notably, both the old and new Standards refer to the attorney-client privilege and not to
the lawyer's broader ethical duty of confidentiality; Little, App.: Proposed Defense
Standards, supra note 8. See PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-3.1(a).
Although the distinction between the two would be lost on many clients, it is worth asking
whether a lawyer ought to distinguish between them or inform the client of the scope of
both the privilege and the duty.
23. There is no question that the 1993 version of Standard 3-3.1(a) requires the
lawyer to discuss with the client the limits of the attorney-client privilege. The
commentary explains, "[bjecause it is critical to a healthy lawyer-client relationship that a
client not be surprised by the revelation of confidences made by an attorney at some time
in the future, counsel should fully and clearly explain to the client the applicable extent of
(and limitations upon) confidentiality in the relevant jurisdiction." 1993 DEFENSE
STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 4-3.1(a) cmt. As mentioned earlier, however, this practice is
not one that has found favor with practitioners, who suggest that it stifles disclosure and
See supra text
inhibits client trust, thereby impeding effective representation.
accompanying note 14.
24. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-3.1; Little, App.: Proposed
Defense Standards, supra note 8.
25. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-3.3(d); Little, App.:
Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 8.
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simultaneously ensuring that a client has been fully informed of the
potential ramifications of such disclosure, these provisions standing
alone do not prevent defense counsel from initiating a frank
discussion of the limits of attorney-client confidentiality.
The question of what to tell the client about the limits of
confidentiality becomes more complicated, however, when the final
sentence of Proposed Standard 4-3.3 is considered. That sentence
admonishes counsel, when interviewing a client, not to "express any
desire for 'calculated ignorance,' meaning that counsel should not
express or intimate to the client that the client should not be candid in
revealing facts for strategic or tactical reasons."26 Under one
interpretation of these provisions, Proposed Standard 4-3.3(d) could
be read to implicitly prohibit (or, at the very least, strongly
discourage) a discussion between the lawyer and client about the
limits of confidentiality. If Proposed Standard 4-3.3 is understood to
govern all client interviews, including the initial client meeting, it
becomes difficult to reconcile a conversation about limitations on
confidentiality with the admonition to avoid even intimating that the
lawyer is seeking less than full disclosure from the client. Particularly
when Proposed Standard 4-3.3(d) is coupled with Proposed Standard
4-3.1(a)'s directive to emphasize the "strong protection" afforded to
attorney-client communications by the evidentiary privilege, defense
counsel might reasonably infer that disclosing the bounds of
confidentiality is a practice disfavored by the Proposed Standards.
One way to reconcile Proposed Standards 4-3.1 and 4-3.3 would
be to interpret each independently. Under that approach, Proposed
Standard 4-3.1(a) requires defense counsel to inform the client about
the attorney-client privilege and its protections at the outset of
representation, but it does not prevent counsel from engaging in a
more complete discussion of the limitations of both the privilege and
the ethical duty of confidentiality. Under this reading, Proposed
Standard 4-3.3(d)'s admonition to avoid the appearance of a desire

26. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-3.3(d) (emphasis added);
Little, App.: Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 8. Roundtable participants held
conflicting views on the wisdom of encouraging such full and candid disclosure. While
some defense attorneys believed they could provide representation most effectively when
the client revealed all, others strongly held the position that they did not want to know
certain facts about the case (including, in some instances, whether the client was guilty in
fact), specifically because knowledge of certain facts might give rise to disclosure
obligations and prevent the lawyer from later soliciting testimony from the defendant in
cort
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for "calculated ignorance" would be limited to subsequent client
interviews, when a renewed discussion of the limits of confidentiality
could be misinterpreted by the client as a warning not to divulge
inconvenient, but otherwise relevant, information to defense counsel.
As Roundtable participants were quick to note, the problem with
this approach is that it assumes the initial client meeting will be a
thorough one, occurring in an environment where the lawyer is able
to explain the nuances and exceptions of confidentiality as well as
position the client to understand the full implications of the
disclosures he will later make to counsel. The reality of criminal
defense practice is not so tidy. Often the first meeting between a
criminal defendant and his lawyer occurs in a holding cell, courtroom,
or other location where privacy and time are limited, and where
meaningful and nuanced conversation is unlikely to occur.
Experienced defense counsel are therefore likely to avoid nuanced
conversation on the subject of confidentiality at the first client
meeting, saving the subject for another day or avoiding it altogether.
Unfortunately, as drafted, the current Standards appear to disapprove
of such a practice, with the result that conscientious lawyers who wish
to advise their clients on the scope of confidentiality may find their
instincts at odds with the language of the Proposed Standards.
Assuming that the Proposed Standards are not intended to
discourage defense counsel from discussing the limits of
confidentiality with the client should that prove advisable," the
question remains how counsel should best approach the topic.
Although the Standards offer no guidance on this point, several
commentators have suggested ways in which defense counsel might
go about informing clients of confidentiality protections and
limitations, cognizant of the balance that must be struck between
27. There are many reasons to favor such a conversation, not least of which is a
concern for client autonomy. As Fred Zacharias observed, "To the extent lawyers
manipulate clients into confiding based on a mistaken view of confidentiality, that
undercuts another of confidentiality's basic rationales: that confidentiality helps clients
make informed choices and thus enhances their dignity and 'autonomy."' Zacharias, supra
note 3, at 381. See also Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to Warn Clients About
Limits on Confidentiality, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 441, 489-90 (1990) ("[A]n attorney
practices deception upon a trusting client when she misstates or refuses to disclose those
circumstances that constitute exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. Deception has
the immediate impact of reducing client autonomy and impairing the trust relationship,
while the rights that deception might vindicate are varied and speculative. Thus, an
attorney is morally required, and should be legally required, to be forthright with a client
and allow the client to choose whether the risks of disclosure outweigh its benefits.").
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ensuring that the explanation provided is "truthful, accurate, and
complete enough to be appreciated by the client" but not "so
complicated and frightening that it unduly chills the open and honest
exchange of information" essential to quality representation.
Professor Roy Sobelson has argued in favor of providing clients with
detailed written disclosure forms,29 while Professor Lee Pizzimenti has
suggested that lawyers are obliged to engage their clients in an
"ongoing conversation" about secrecy and disclosure-a conversation
that should begin at the outset of representation and be revisited as
questions arise.' One ethics textbook suggests that lawyers make
brief reference to the existence of exceptions to the confidentiality
rules during the initial client interview, and follow up with a more
detailed discussion if the client inquires further." Others have argued
strenuously that placing any emphasis on the exceptions is misguided
and will only have detrimental effects on the ability of the lawyer to
effectively represent her client's interests.32
This discontinuity of approach and underlying principle was
reflected in the Roundtable conversations. A number of seasoned
current and former defense attorneys argued strenuously that
anything less than a pledge of complete confidentiality will
undermine client trust, making effective representation nearly
impossible. Other veteran attorneys, however, expressed deep
discomfort with pledging absolute confidentiality to a client while
knowing that they possess an ethical obligation to avoid suborning
perjury and may have a duty to report serious threats of harm made

28. Roy M. Sobelson, Lawyers, Clients, and Assurances of Confidentiality: Lawyers
Talking Without Speaking, Clients Hearing Without Listening, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
703, 772 (1987).
29. Id., 772-74 (providing a sample disclosure form).
30. Pizzimenti takes the position that counsel is obliged to "give a general explanation
of the duty of confidentiality and its major exceptions. In that way, the client will have
enough information to enable him to ask intelligent questions as specific confidentiality
issues arise." Pizzimenti, supra note 27, at 485.
31. See Clark D. Cunningham, How To Explain Confidentiality?,9 CLINICAL L. REV.
579, 588 (2003) (citing ROBERT F. COCHRAN ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A
COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 70-71
(1999)). See also Stephen Ellmann, Truth and Consequences, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 895,
920-21 (2000) (charting a similar middle course).
32. See, e.g., MONROE FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER'S ETHICS 119 (1990);
Ellmann, Truth and Consequences, supra note 31, at 918 (discussing Anthony
Amsterdam's suggested use of a model statement of confidentiality that suggests to the
client that the duty of confidentiality is absolute).
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by the client." The debate within the academic literature and among
seasoned practitioners highlights the need for guidance on how to
best approach the subject of client confidentiality and its limits when
counseling criminal defendants. That guidance is not found in the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and, at this time, cannot be
found in the Proposed Defense Standards.
Defining best practice standards with respect to client counseling
on confidentiality requires engagement with fundamental questions
about the nature of representation. Are confidentiality protections
meant to advance the autonomy interests of clients or are they meant
to ease the job of defense counsel who may be unable to achieve
optimal outcomes in the absence of important facts? Who should
decide what information is worthy of revelation: The client or the
lawyer? While achieving consensus on these important matters may
be difficult, if the Standards are to remain influential in helping
defense counsel determine how best to position clients for effective
representation, the Standards Committee would do well to provide
further guidance on this important topic.
H. Disclosure during the Course of Representation:
Whether, When, and To Whom?
Regardless whether a lawyer advises her client at the outset of
representation of the circumstances under which disclosure of
confidential information may occur, circumstances may arise during the
course of the representation that invite her to consider disclosing client
communications to a third party.34 In such circumstances, the lawyer
must answer several questions. First, as a threshold matter, she must
determine whether disclosure is ethically permissible. If so, she must
next determine whether disclosure (if discretionary) is the best course of
action and what, if any, steps should be taken to inform the client of the

33. The most common types of disclosed threats mentioned by Roundtable
participants were threats of harm to significant others made in the context of domestic
violence disputes and suicidal threats.
34. In Leslie Levin's 1993 survey of New Jersey lawyers, sixty-seven of them reported
having encountered at least one situation in "which they reasonably believed that a client
was going to commit a specific wrongful act that was likely to result in death or substantial
bodily harm to an identifiable third party." Levin, supra note 14, at 111-12. Participants
in the Wisconsin Roundtable expressed skepticism about that finding, stating that it
contradicted their experience that credible threats of serious harm to third parties rarely
arise, while Cardozo participants suggested that such situations are unusual outside the
context of domestic violence disputes.
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disclosure decision. Finally, if the lawyer opts to disclose, she must
decide what to say and to whom to reveal the information. The
Standards have much to say about the threshold question, but are
strangely silent with respect to the remaining questions counsel must
resolve.
Both the current and proposed Defense Standards set forth clear
conditions for the disclosure of otherwise confidential client
communications.35 The Standards list numerous conditions that may
justify discretionary disclosure of confidential information. One of
these exceptions is triggered when client communications give rise to a
belief that the physical, financial, or property interests of third parties
will be harmed absent disclosure." The current Standards provide that
disclosure without prior client authorization is permitted "to the extent
[counsel] reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from
committing a criminal act that defense counsel believes is likely to result
in imminent death or substantial bodily harm.""" The Proposed
Standards expand the scope of the exception and permit disclosure of
otherwise confidential information "to prevent reasonably certain
death, substantial bodily harm, or substantial financial or property harm
that defense counsel's services have been or will be used to further."38
These revisions are consistent with recent changes to the Model Rules
of Professional Responsibility, which have broadened the circumstances
under which disclosure of client communications may be ethically
permitted."

35. See, e.g., 1993 DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 4-4.6(d) (disclosure of
physical evidence); Id. § 4-8.6(d) (challenges to the effectiveness of counsel); PROPOSED
STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-1.7 (disclosure of confidential communications conveyed to
lawyer advisory group); Id. § 4-4.6(d) (disclosure of physical evidence); Id. § 4-9.6
(challenges to the effectiveness of counsel).
36. See PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-3.7(d); Little, App.: Proposed
Defense Standards, supra note 8.
37. 1993 DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 4-3.7(d).
38. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-3.7(d); Little, App.: Proposed Defense
Standards, supra note 8.
39. See MODEL RULES, supra note 5, at R. 1.6 (authorizing disclosure "to prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;" "to prevent the client from
committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the
financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or
is using the lawyer's services;" and "to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the
financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted
from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has
used the lawyer's services"). See also Amanda Vance & Randi Wallach, Note, Updating
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On its face, Proposed Standard 4-3.79(d) appears more streamlined
than its 1993 predecessor. The Proposed Standard eliminates the
"reasonable belief" and imminence requirements contained in the
current Standards (though it adds a requirement that the anticipated
harm be "reasonably certain" to result absent disclosure). The revision
also does away with the requirement that disclosure be designed to
prevent the client from committing a crime when death or substantial
bodily harm are on the line: Under the Proposed Standard, defense
counsel may disclose client confidences to prevent harm even in the
absence of threatened criminal conduct by the client.' Despite these
changes, however, some aspects of the threshold standard for disclosure
remain unclear.
To illustrate the problem, imagine that a defendant has been
charged with stalking his ex-girlfriend. After learning that the exgirlfriend was seen walking on the beach with another man, the
defendant tells his lawyer that he is going to make sure the woman
never walks again. Assume defense counsel is reasonably certain that
her client is planning to carry out the threat and has already made plans
to do so. What options are available to the lawyer?
Under the Proposed Standards, disclosure is permitted "to prevent
reasonably certain ... substantial bodily harm;"41 consequently, the
lawyer must ask herself whether disclosure in this instance would, in
fact, prevent substantial bodily harm to her client's ex-girlfriend. In
answering that question, should the lawyer ask whether disclosure might
make a difference? Whether it will have that effect? How certain must
she be that disclosure will prevent the harm? The question is an
important one, particularly when the effectiveness of disclosure turns on
the response of third parties to the information disclosed.
In this scenario, what would law enforcement do with the
information the lawyer wishes to disclose? Perhaps police could take
proactive steps to protect the potential victim, particularly if the
offender is already under supervision or subject to a restraining order.
Confidentiality: An Overview of the Recent Changes to Model Rule 1.6, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1003 (2004).
40. For an example of the difference between these two standards, see David Lew,
Note, Revised Model Rule 1.6: What Effect Will the New Rule Have on Practicing
Attorneys?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 881, 881 (2005) (describing scenario in which
disclosure of confidential information would prevent death but would not prevent the
client from engaging in criminal activity).
41. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standard 4-3.7(d); Little, App.: Proposed
Defense Standards, supra note 8.
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But what if the police are unable to take preventive action and
disclosure of the client's threat is unlikely to prevent injury? Under a
close reading of the Proposed Standard, it appears that disclosure would
not be permitted, much less advised, in such an instance.42 But what if it
were unclear whether disclosure to law enforcement-or even to the
victim herself-would have the desired effect? As this hypothetical
scenario demonstrates, although Proposed Standard 4-3.7(d) eliminates
some of the subjective elements inherent in the 1993 Standard, it has
introduced important new questions.
The failure of the Proposed Standards to provide perfect clarity
regarding the standard for disclosure is in many ways a harmless error.
Although the standard governing disclosure is the only aspect of the
disclosure decision on which the Proposed Standards offer substantial
guidance, it is also the least useful feature of Proposed Standard 4-3.7.
The Proposed Standards' attempt to carefully articulate the conditions
under which disclosure is permitted in cases of anticipated physical
harm or criminal conduct is largely immaterial to practitioners, who are
obliged to comply not with the disclosure standards set forth in
Proposed Standard 4-3.7(d), but with the approach taken by the
jurisdictions in which they practice. Some of these differ significantly
from Proposed Standard 4-3.7(d).43 Although this is a reality the
42. Thanks to Professor Walter J. Dickey for suggesting a version of this hypothetical
with its implications for disclosure under the Rules of Professional Conduct (and, by
extension, under the Standard 4-3.7(d)).
43. See, e.g., MICH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (c)(4) (2007) ("A lawyer may

reveal . . . the intention of a client to commit a crime and the information necessary to
prevent the crime."); OR. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2005) ("A lawyer

may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary ... to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm."); TENN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1), (c)(1) (2008) ("A lawyer may
reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes disclosure is necessary . .. to prevent the client or another person from
committing a crime, including a crime that is reasonably certain to result in substantial
injury to the financial interest or property of another . . ." and "shall reveal information
relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
disclosure is necessary .. . to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm."
(emphasis added)); Wis. SUP. Cr. R. 20:1.6(b), (c)(1)-(2) (2007) ("A lawyer shall reveal
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that
the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm or in
substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another" and "may reveal
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary to prevent reasonably likely death or substantial bodily harm" or "to
prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission of
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Proposed Standards themselves anticipate,' it makes more troubling
the Proposed Standard's failure to provide guidance on other aspects of
disclosure that are not addressed by Rules of Professional Conduct and
on which the Proposed Standards could be influential to practitioner
decision making.
One area in which the Proposed Standards might offer greater
guidance relates to the conduct of defense counsel after she has
determined that disclosure is permitted under Standard 4-3.7(d). When
and to whom should disclosure be made? Should the client be told of
the proposed disclosure before or after it occurs, or not at all? Despite
the weightiness of these questions, the Proposed Standards provide no
clear answers to any of them.
The absence of Standards addressing these questions might be of
small consequence, were guidance available from other sources. In fact,
however, these questions are ones with which practitioners are left to
wrestle in private. Given the sacrosanct manner in which confidentiality
is treated within the legal community, it is not entirely surprising that
lawyers are not quick to confess to disclosure of client information and
that the legal literature glosses over the details of how disclosure should
occur in those rare occasions when it is required or permitted.
Participants in the Roundtable discussions indicated that they rarely
encountered situations in which disclosure was necessary and provided
few examples of such disclosure. One lawyer admitted that he had once
intimated to a bailiff that his client posed a danger, but did not provide
the bailiff with details of how or in what way the client was dangerous.
Several attorneys had reported to jail officials that their clients were at
risk of suicide, and a few others indicated that they had disclosed threats
made by clients to the clients' domestic partners or former partners.
Somewhat more common were instances in which attorneys asked to
withdraw from representation rather than call their clients to testify at
trial.
Interestingly, a substantial number of attorneys acknowledged
either relaying facts gleaned from client communications to state
attorneys in the course of plea negotiations, or having witnessed other

a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services."
(emphasis added)).
44. See PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-1.1(a) ("These Standards do not
modify a defense attorney's ethical obligations under applicable rule[s] of professional
conduct."); Little, App.: Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 8.
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attorneys do so without express client authorization.45 What was
striking about the Roundtable conversations on this subject was the
discomfort that surrounded attorneys' discussion of the mechanics of
disclosure. Whether this was a result of the participants' lack of
experience with disclosing such information or the powerful
professional taboos against doing so (or some combination of both) was
unclear, but it seemed to suggest that formal, external guidance might
be useful for those practitioners who find themselves in a position
where disclosure is mandated or where the exercise of discretion leads
to a decision to reveal client confidences.
What points of decision ought such guidance address? One is
whether lawyers should be obliged to inform clients when disclosure of
confidential information is contemplated or takes place. Proposed
Standard 4-3.7(a) requires defense counsel to "always advise his or her
clients to comply with the law."' It does not say, however, whether the
lawyer is required to discuss the possibility of disclosure if the client fails
to abandon any planned criminal activity. Proposed Standard 4-5.1
directs defense counsel to "advise the accused with complete candor
concerning all aspects of the case." 47 Although this Standard at first
blush appears to be a promising source of guidance (since surely the
disclosure of client communications could be considered one "aspect
of the case"), the relevant language of Proposed Standard 4-5.1 is
taken directly from 1993 Standard 4-5.1.48 The commentary to the
earlier Standard pertains solely to advising the client on the plea
decision: It makes no reference to matters arising within the course of
representation that do not directly relate to the client's pending
criminal charge.49
Though the Proposed Standards offer no direct guidance on this
matter, a few state codes of professional conduct explicitly require
45. Several attorneys described their understanding that most disclosures made in this
context were implicitly authorized by the client's decision to seek a plea deal. A large
number of Roundtable participants, however, acknowledged having witnessed other
defense attorneys share confidential information with abandon in the context of plea
negotiations.
46. See PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 3-4.7(a); Little, App.: Proposed
Defense Standards, supra note 8; cf 1993 DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 4-3.7(d)
cmt. ("Where practical, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client to take suitable
action.").
47. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-5.1; Little, App.: Proposed Defense
Standards, supra note 8.
48. See 1993 DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 4-5.1.
49. See id. cmt.
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attorneys to consult with clients before or after disclosing confidential
information when disclosure has been prompted by concerns
California's Rules of
regarding anticipated harm to others.
Professional Conduct direct lawyers, when "reasonable under the
circumstances," to engage clients in honest conversation before
revealing confidential information intended to prevent a criminal act
that is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm to an
individual."o During that conversation, lawyers are directed to "make
a good faith effort to persuade the client ... not to commit or to
continue the criminal act or ... to pursue a course of conduct that will
prevent the threatened death or substantial bodily harm."' The rule
also directs the lawyer to inform the client "at an appropriate time" of
the lawyer's "ability or decision to disclose" client communications.52
Virginia similarly requires its lawyers to consult with clients when
disclosure is contemplated in anticipation of a client's criminal act.
Under the Virginia rules, lawyers are required to "promptly reveal ...
the intention of a client, as stated by the client, to commit a crime and
the information necessary to prevent the crime."53 Before making
such a revelation, however, the lawyer must, "where feasible, advise
the client of the possible legal consequences of the action, urge the
client not to commit the crime, and advise the client that the attorney
must reveal the client's criminal intention unless thereupon
abandoned, and, if the crime involves perjury by the client, that the
attorney shall seek to withdraw as counsel."54 These state rules take
the position that forthrightness is desirable within the lawyer-client

50. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-100(B), (C) (2004), in RICHARD ZITRIN
ET AL., LEGAL ETHICS: RULES, STATUTES, AND COMPARISONS 615 (2009).
51. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-100(C)(1).
52. Id. at R. 3-100(C)(2). The text of this rule is not entirely clear with respect to the
timing of a lawyer's revelation to his client that protected communications have been or
will be disclosed. Rule 3-100(C) states that, "when reasonable," the rule's provisions must
be followed before the lawyer reveals confidential information; however, Subsection
(C)(2) indicates that the lawyer should inform the client of the disclosure decision "at an
appropriate time." Id. The Commentary to the Rule clarifies that the appropriate time
for such disclosure will "vary depending upon the circumstances" and may in some cases
be inappropriate entirely, such as when "informing a client of [counsel's] ability or
decision to reveal confidential information . . . would likely increase the risk of death or
substantial bodily harm, not only to the originally-intended victims of the criminal act, but
also to the client or members of the client's family, or to [counsel] or [counsel's] family or
associates." Id. cmt. 9.
53. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(1) (2000).
54. Id.
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relationship, even on matters as sensitive as disclosure." While both
the California and Virginia rules leave room for lawyers to conceal
disclosure from their clients when safety requires it, they do not
permit defense counsel to hide the fact of disclosure based on concerns
over the lawyer's professional reputation or future business interests.
Reasonable professionals may disagree with the requirements
imposed by California and Virginia with respect to client consultation
around the issue of disclosure. To their credit, however, the state codes
of professional conduct tackle the issue of client confrontation in a
forthright way that the Proposed Standards do not. Given the
complexity of the decisions counsel must make in this regard, the
Proposed Standards' failure to address the need for client
consultation before or after disclosure is disappointing. Similarly, the
Standards' silence on other questions related to disclosure under
Standard 4-3.7(d)-such as to whom and when disclosures should be
made-is a missed opportunity to increase the relevance of the
Proposed Defense Standards to practicing defense attorneys.
III. Disclosure After Representation:
To What Degree Should Confidences Be Revealed?
The aspects of the Proposed Standards' treatment of
confidentiality and disclosure that received the most response (both
favorable and unfavorable) from Roundtable participants related to
The Proposed Standards provide
post-representation disclosure.
significantly more direction than the 1993 Defense Standards on these
issues, as exemplified by Proposed Standards 4-4.6 (Relationship
Between Prior and Successor Counsel) and 4-9.6 (Challenges to the
Effectiveness of Counsel). What made these Proposed Standards more
robust (and consequently, more discussion-provoking) than other
confidentiality-related provisions? Primarily, it is their willingness to
cover new ground, offering novel or expanded guidance on matters that
defense counsel are routinely forced to confront and on which
reasonable attorneys might differ in their approach. In so doing,
55. There are hints in the academic literature that client confrontation prior to disclosure
may serve a practical, as well as a dignitary, purpose. In Levin's 1993 study of New Jersey
lawyers, "the vast majority of lawyers who believed that their clients were going to commit
wrongful acts that were likely to cause substantial bodily harm reported that they discussed
this belief with their clients." Levin, supra note 14, at 117. Lawyers surveyed reported that
most clients did not commit the wrongful acts after counseling, a fact the lawyers largely
attributed to their own intervention. Id. at 116.
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Proposed Standards 4-4.6 and 4-9.6 address the purpose of and the
degree to which permissible disclosures may be made when
representation has ended.
Proposed Standard 4-4.6 addresses for the first time the potentially
complicated issue of communications between prior and successor
counsel on matters pertaining to client representation.16 During the
course of representation, criminal defendants may change lawyers for
many reasons, including conflicts of interest, scheduling problems,
personality conflicts, or changes in financial circumstance. When
counsel changes, the former lawyer is placed in a potentially difficult
situation. Not wanting to prejudice her former client, 7 she will
ordinarily be inclined to cooperate with successor counsel to the
greatest degree possible by providing necessary information about the
status of the case and any ongoing litigation. At the same time,
depending on the reasons for the change in lawyers, there may be
information the client wishes to conceal from successor counsel. Under
such circumstances, how is a lawyer to decide what may and may not be
disclosed?
To guide lawyers in navigating this situation, Proposed Standard 44.6 identifies the purpose of disclosure-to advance the client's interest
through cooperation with successor counsel 58-and within that context
While
limits the degree to which disclosures are permitted.
acknowledging that cooperation between counsel is ordinarily in the
client's best interest,59 Proposed Standard 4-4.6 emphasizes the duty of
prior counsel to "protect the client's privileges, confidences and secrets,
and seek a release from the client before sharing such information" with
successor counsel.60

56. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-4.6; Little, App.: Proposed Defense
Standards, supra note 8.
57. See PROPSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-1.3(a) (describing defense counsel's
ongoing duty of loyalty to current and former clients); Little, App.: Proposed Defense
Standards, supra note 8.
58. Cf PROPSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-7.11 ("Trial counsel should take
steps to ensure that the client is continuously represented by some competent defense
counsel, through the verdict, post-trial motions, sentence, and appeal, so that the client's
rights are fully protected at all times."); Little, App.: Proposed Defense Standards, supra
note 8.
59. See PROPSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-4.6(a); Little, App.: Proposed
Defense Standards, supranote 8.
60. PROPSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-4.6(b); Little, App.: Proposed Defense
Standards, supra note 8.
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Several Roundtable participants indicated that the Proposed
Standard had raised their awareness of confidentiality issues
surrounding successor counsel, a topic that ordinarily receives little
attention. Participants noted that often the transition from former to
successor counsel is prompted by a conflict between lawyer and client
that arises out of counsel's access to confidential information. In such
cases, counsel must be particularly careful to avoid unauthorized
disclosure to successor counsel, remembering that confidences belong to
the client and not to the lawyer. By identifying a recurring situation
with important ethical implications not previously addressed by the
Standards, Proposed Standard 4-4.6 provides useful guidance to former
defense counsel seeking to comply with their ethical obligations while
assisting successor counsel in seamlessly assuming full representation of
the criminal defendant.
Proposed Standard 4-9.6 provides enhanced guidance on a matter
addressed in less detail by previous versions of the Standards. It is wellestablished that the lawyer's duty of confidentiality is abrogated when
the client brings a claim against his lawyer, including a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Within that broad rule, however,
questions often arise regarding the degree of permissible disclosure.
When the lawyer is asked to balance the robust defense of her
professional conduct against her continuing duties of loyalty and
confidentiality to her client,62 how is she to decide how much
confidential information to reveal?
The 1993 version of Standard 8-6(d) tersely described the
confidentiality obligations of defense counsel in the context of claims of
ineffectiveness, stating:
Defense counsel whose conduct of a criminal case is drawn into
question is entitled to testify concerning the matters charged
and is not precluded from disclosing the truth concerning the
accusation to the extent defense counsel reasonably believes
necessary, even though this involves revealing matters which
were given in confidence." 63

61. See, e.g., MODEL RULE, supra note 5, at R. 1.6(b)(5) ("A lawyer may reveal
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary ... to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client.").
62. See PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-1.3(a), (b); Little, App.: Proposed
Defense Standards, supra note 8.
63. 1993 DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 4-8.6(d).
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The comment to that Standard provides some additional guidance,
indicating that in such proceedings counsel may only "reveal that
confidential information he or she reasonably believes to be necessary
to reveal in order to shed light upon the particular matters at issue." 6
The current Standard does not discuss the scope of disclosure or any
other relevant considerations.
The proposed revision to former Standard 4-8.6 is a significant
development over its predecessor. Proposed Standard 4-9.6(e) offers a
lengthy description of defense counsel's confidentiality obligations in
the context of post-representation proceedings challenging counsel's
effectiveness. In its entirety, the new subsection explains:
Defense counsel whose conduct of a criminal case is drawn into
question is entitled to testify concerning the matters charged
and is not precluded from disclosing the truth concerning the
matters raised by his former client to the extent reasonably
necessary, even though this involves revealing matters which
were given in confidence. However, former defense counsel
continues to have a duty of loyalty to the former client, and
should carefully consider whether some other course of
conduct, short of revealing damaging client confidences or
privileged information, is appropriate.
A waiver of the duty of confidence or the attorney-client
privilege should not be presumed simply from the filing of an
ineffective assistance claim. Rather, a fully informed and
voluntary contemporaneous waiver from the client should be
sought and the court and counsel advised of potential privilege
and confidentiality claims. Even if the privilege is found to be
waived, former counsel should, to the extent permitted by law,
restrict the disclosure of confidences only to the extent that
disclosure is necessary for the relevant purposes of the
d.65
proceeding.
Rather than offering a generalized rehashing of the exception to
the confidentiality rule found in ABA Model Rule 1.6(5),' Proposed
Standard 4-9.6(e) offers a more nuanced description of the options
available to counsel. The Standard acknowledges the possibility of
disclosure, but also invites consideration of reasonable alternatives to,
64. Id. cmt.
65. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-9.6(e); Little, App.: Proposed Defense
Standards, supra note 8.
66. See PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-7.11; Little, App.: Proposed
Defense Standards, supra note 8.
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and limitations on, divulging client communications that encourage
counsel to thoughtfully necessity of disclosure in any given case. The
Proposed Standards suggest that although counsel may wish to
defend the manner in which she handled her client's case, she should
not view herself as her former client's opponent in such proceedings.
Instead, former counsel should "to the extent possible, continue to
consider the client's best interests."67
While the guidance offered by the Proposed Standard is
significantly more detailed than that offered in the current version of
the Standard, the proposal notably does not go as far as a recent
formal opinion issued by the American Bar Association's Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility.' That opinion,
interpreting defense counsel's ethical obligation to avoid disclosure of
information relating to client representation, takes the position that
the abrogation of confidentiality brought about by an ineffective
assistance claim is highly limited. The opinion suggests that a client's
filing of an ineffective assistance claim, standing alone, "does not
constitute 'informed consent' to the lawyer's voluntary disclosure of
client information" outside a judicial proceeding, and that (contrary
to common belief) the so-called "self-defense exception" to Rule of
Professional Responsibility 1.6 is not generally applicable in the
context of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 9 The opinion
suggests that "it is highly unlikely" that disclosure of otherwise
privileged client information outside a judicial proceeding will ever be
justifiable in the context of an ineffective assistance claim.'o That
particular interpretation of defense counsel's obligations does not
necessarily flow from the language of Proposed Standard 4-9.6(e),
suggesting that the Proposed Standard may need additional
development and clarification.
How much the Standards should weigh in on the specifics of
disclosure in the ineffective assistance context was a matter of
considerable debate among Roundtable participants. Participants in
the Roundtable discussions reacted in strong and opposing ways to
the ethics opinion, with some lauding its conclusions and calling for
67. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 4-9.6(f); Little, App.: Proposed Defense
Standards, supra note 8. To that end, the Proposed Standard prohibits counsel from
relying on the prosecutor to act as her lawyer during proceedings adjudicating the former
client's ineffectiveness claim.
6& See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-456 (2010).
69. Id. at 2-3.
70. Id. at 5.
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greater consonance between the Proposed Standards and the ethics
opinion, and others (particularly prosecutors) expressing grave
concern over the Standards' potential adoption of the strongly proconfidentiality position adopted by the ethics opinion. The vigor of
the debate illustrated the lack of consensus among practitioners
regarding the scope of confidentiality in the ineffective assistance
context, and the need for greater clarity on the ethical and
professional obligations of defense counsel responding to allegations
of deficient performance. On this topic, as on many of the others
discussed above, the Standards can prove a significant resource for
lawyers trying to discharge their responsibilities ably. Proposed
Standard 4-9.6(e) makes significant improvements over its
predecessor, but could be improved even more substantially by
responding to the situation where a lawyer is free to disclose
confidential information because of an ineffective assistance claim
brought by a former client. By providing thoughtful guidance on the
options available to a lawyer facing a claim of ineffectiveness and
inviting a response that goes beyond the minimum permitted under
the ethics rules, Proposed Standard 4-9.6(e) could easily become a
model of how the Criminal Justice Standards might serve the needs of
practitioners, while advancing the overall quality of criminal defense
representation.

Conclusion
The Proposed Criminal Justice Standards have much to say
about the duty of confidentiality and the varied circumstances in
which it may be abrogated. The guidance offered by the Proposed
Standards could be made more robust and hence, more helpful,
however, if they were to more directly confront the thorniest
questions defense counsel face. These questions include how much to
tell clients about the limits of confidentiality; whether, when, and to
whom disclosure should be made during the course of representation;
and to what degree post-representation disclosures should be made to
successor counsel and to courts adjudicating claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Only by confronting these difficult questions
can the Proposed Standards rightfully retain their claim as "the single
most comprehensive ... undertaking in the field of criminal justice
ever attempted by the American legal profession.""
71. Warren E. Burger, Introduction: The ABA Standardsfor CriminalJustice, 12 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 251 (1974).
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